The Berbatov Problem – an in-depth analysis

WARNING: This is not a short read.

Ah, Dimitar.

Like, I would imagine, all of my fellow United supporters, I had very high hopes for Mr. Berbatov when he arrived at the club. An alternative to the direct, destructive capabilities of Ronaldo and Rooney and the hard work of Tevez. A more composed, elegant attacking force which would surely provide the key ingredient to unlock the tightest defences.

You don’t need me to tell you how the past two seasons have gone. Berbatov has not exactly set the world on fire, but nor has he been, by any stretch of the imagination, a ‘flop’ as some have suggested. Up until the second half of the season just gone, there were, it seemed, two distinct factions between Manchester United supporters. Those who adored Berbatov and thought the team should be built around him, and those who thought he was a worse than useless waste of money who was detrimental to our play.

And then Rooney got injured.
With key games left to play in the title run-in, Berbatov had to step up. “Now he’ll really show the doubters,” was the opinion of the pro-Berbatov camp. “Well, here’s his chance. It’s now or never,” mused the anti-Berbistas.

As we know, it generally didn’t work out. The most glaring failure was our 0-0 draw at Blackburn, which had we won, would’ve surely seen us win the title. And yet Berbatov worked harder than perhaps he ever had before. But the clinical edge of Rooney was absent, and the rest is history.

Now, people have often spoken of Berbatov’s scoring record. Scott of the excellent Republik of Mancunia has defended this on several occasions, but the fact is that we knew we weren’t signing the next Alan Shearer, even if the Bulgarian did allegedly used to sleep in a Newcastle shirt (we all have our foibles.) He was a creative, deep-lying, playmaker sort of striker. Not a non-goalscoring striker in the Emile Heskey mould – perish the thought – but rather a striker who could do things besides scoring goals better. The Bulgarian Totti, perhaps. And so he was always going to be unsuited to being a lone striker.

Or was he? Speaking of Totti, when, in the 2005-06 season, (largely due to circumstance, in a similar manner that Berbatov was) he was thrust into being a lone striker for Luciano Spalleti’s Roma side, the new ‘strikerless’ formation was remarkably successful, and hugely influential throughout football. Particularly on our very own Sir Alex Ferguson.

Our Champions League-winning team of ’08, then so dependent on the fluid attacking force permitted by Ronaldo that, despite posessing many of the same players, it has effectively been dismantled – was often referred to as ‘strikerless’, but it was in an entirely different way. It was more that it lacked a permanent, obvious striker, not that we were simply never playing with somebody looking to lead the line, as Roma were. But then after Ronaldo left, we played Rooney centrally in a 4-3-3 when it came to the big games. And Rooney is no Kevin Davies either.

As is illustrated in more depth in this article by the superb ZonalMarking, Rooney’s effectiveness as a lone striker does not come from his energy and physicality – although this helps when he does want to act in a more traditional manner – but rather from his movement, and his dropping deep and pulling defenders out of position – acting as a ‘false number nine.’ Also on that article is the perfect example of this, the goal against Arsenal at the Emirates this year.  Rooney is perfect for this role, as he is, despite what we are frequently told by know-nothing media sorts, an intelligent and disciplined footballer, and has the right attributes – an ability to make calm, short passes under pressure, excellent movement, and the ability to drop deep and play more creatively.

But hold on, doesn’t that description remind you of someone even more? Like Berbatov? This is why his ineffectiveness in the role was such a mystery – in theory, he was perfectly suited for it. There are many reasons that could be posed as explanations for why it failed – perhaps he was simply out of form at the time, or that unlike Rooney, he did not have an understanding of the role. But his natural attributes appear to make him an even better candidate for the role than Rooney. So why did it fail?

To compare Rooney and Berbatov this season, we will first have a quick look at their statistics.

ROONEY

Overall

Played: 43
Scored: 33 (5 of which pens)
Assists: 6
Total Involved: 39
Goals per game: 0.77
Assists per game: 0.14
Goals involved per game: 0.91

BERBATOV

Overall

Played: 42
Scored: 12
Assists: 6
Total Involved: 18
Goals per game: 0.29
Assists per game: 0.14
Goals involved per game: 0.43

It may be quite surprising, given that Rooney, when in a 4-4-2, has generally played as an out-and-out striker, and given Berbatov’s creative instincts, that they both have the same relatively small number of assists. But statistics will rarely tell the whole story. Anybody who has watched United regularly this season will attest to Berbatov’s excellent build-up play that can occur before the goal or assist. The combination of Berbatov playing Valencia into space with a clever pass before the Ecuadorian crosses to Rooney for a goal is one that has happened very regularly this season.

But now, we will compare the statistics of the two players when operating as a lone striker in a 4-3-3, and see how they compare.

ROONEY

4-3-3

Played: 17
Scored: 13
Assists: 2
Total Involved: 15
Goals per game: 0.76
Assists per game: 0.12
Goals involved per game: 0.88

BERBATOV

4-3-3

Played: 5*
Scored: 2
Assists: 1
Total involved: 3
Goals per game: 0.4
Assists per game: 0.2
Goals involved per game: 0.6

*Berbatov has made numerous substitute appearances in games that have started with a 4-3-3, but his arrival is rarely in replacement for Rooney, and therefore usually signifies a switch to 4-4-2. Because of this, in addition to the fact that many of these substitutions are very late on, I have chosen to discount these.

As we can see, Rooney’s statistics are scarcely any different when performing in a 4-3-3 to his overall stats. Perhaps surprising, given his role as a ‘false nine’, he does not have a higher rate of assists. But again, if we look at Rooney’s goal against Arsenal at the Emirates, we see that although it was Nani with the assist, the goal was started by Rooney dropping deep. Again, the stats do not show the vital, creative build-up play.

Berbatov, on the other hand, appears to operate much more effectively in a 4-3-3, although the argument can be made that he did not play here enough for the statistics to be very reliable. Certainly he was not as effective as Rooney. This will need a deeper investigation.

Let’s compare the passing patterns of Rooney in a 4-3-3. Being in a 4-4-2 or a 4-3-3 isn’t a simple case of Rooney looking to be attacking himself or creative, respectively. In a 4-3-3, he contributes more to the build-up play. His creative passes generally go out to the wings, and are unlikely to be assists because of that. We can see here that Rooney generally tries to drop deep and distribute his passing out wide: http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/chalkboards/1w5aHWX02c03bR2Y0r1y

The difference between Rooney in a 4-3-3 and a 4-4-2 is seen best in the home game against Aston Villa, where we started with a 4-3-3, only for Michael Owen to come on at half time and force a switch to a 4-4-2. In the first half, Rooney make very few passes into the box:http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/chalkboards/014Ht58S3C2iVf6V324b

But in the second half, he puts far more balls directly into the penalty area: http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/chalkboards/4N3N9BkD5ZRYt2s4QQ85

Arguably Rooney is therefore more ‘creative’ in a 4-4-2 as he is looking to set other players up – the difference is that he does not contribute to the overall build-up play as much.

All this still points to Berbatov surely being able to fulfil this duty. So what’s the problem? Well, let’s take a look at his passing.

Against Blackburn, the most obvious thing to point out is that Berbatov’s passing is generally a lot shorter than Rooney’s. When Berbatov plays up front on his own, we can see here that he generally takes the short option. And crucially, unlike Rooney, he almost never passes the ball from the centre out wide – the wings have been the basis of our creativity this season, as we have become a team that does everything best, defensively and offensively, out wide. He does not compensate in other ways either – only four of his passes are into the box, and these are all around the perimeter: http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/chalkboards/3P1M5I19GB4J8K836k0t

Against Chelsea is even more astonishing – the same is true, but the sheer number of passes Berbatov makes, as the focal point of a team who was on the pitch for 90 minutes, is astonishing. He failed to impose himself on the game and had a lower pass completion rate:  http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/chalkboards/89K3u7m5323E73Kh63xj

Ultimately, Berbatov again takes the safe option – but in a game where we had little posession, we needed to use it when we had it in as dangerous a manner as possible. Whether it is a lack of understanding of the role or a mental problem, we do not know, but it is clear that Berbatov is too eager to play the safe option when thrust up front on his own.

What this also points to, however, is that Berbatov is a very strange sort of player. Generally, the ‘second striker’ will not play a huge amount of passes, but will look to provide key passes that will lead directly to goals. You can have two players who are very good at passing, but will still be very different – a classic example would be Sneijder and Xavi, or our own Giggs (playing in the centre) and Scholes. Whilst the former will play farther forward, and generally contribute a lot more assists, the latter will generally have a better range of passing, and make a lot more passes but look to keep play ticking over and take control of the game. Berbatov is unique in that he appears to be a hybrid – he plays very far forward, but he also, if you watch him, actually contributes very few ‘defence-splitting’ passes – his game is generally to keep attacking play ticking over, to keep posession in tight situations, and to generally keep play progressing without necessarily providing the killer move.

Having said that, against all but the best opposition, we still tended to play well without Rooney when we played with two strikers, Berbatov and a goalscorer like Macheda or Owen. With both unlikely to be injured at the same point next season, and the addition of the prolific Hernandez, this will hopefully be a problem which we will avoid next season.

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